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DEVELOPMENT IN ADVERSITY: 
SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL 
PARTICIPATION IN PERSPECTIVE 
 




Defence industrial participation (DIP) is a form of countertrade and falls in 
the sub-category of (defence) offsets. The South African DIP programme played a 
developmental role in the country’s defence industrial base (DIB), arresting its 
steady decline since the 1980s. This article discusses the perceived non-
achievement of the 1997 DIP objectives and the reality of its manifestations over a 
12-year period (2000–2012). It is argued that the DIP tripled the gross national 
product and improved the economy through the retention of some 58 000 jobs. 
However, the 2014 Defence Review paves the way for a new defence industrial 
dispensation. Notwithstanding, there is a need to explore the concomitant 
ambiguity that exists between perceptions of countertrade and offsets as trade-
distorting practices and as value-adding prospects, and to ascertain how this 
reciprocal trade mechanism could be used better to promote the developmental 
aims and objectives of governments.  
Introduction 
Countertrade internationally, manifests in many forms.2 The most popular 
form of countertrade since the mid-1990s is offsets that occur in both defence and 
civil procurement. Offsets are procurement advantages used by governments 
procuring products and services from abroad to seek various forms of reciprocal 
benefits for a country’s domestic industry in return for the weapons or high-value 
civil purchases (e.g. passenger aircraft).3 As 
a result of the biggest defence transaction in 
South Africa, the Strategic Defence Package 
(SDP) of December 1999, incurred R15 
billion worth of DIP obligations. This article 
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focuses on the DIP stemming from the SDP. 
Approximately 40 percent of countries applying the principle of 
reciprocity, use various purposely structured government procurement programmes 
to procure goods and services from abroad.4 Although defence-related countertrade 
(hereafter referred to as ‘defence offsets’), in particular, has been controversial in 
many contexts, it may play a positive developmental role, including developing 
and maintaining a defence industrial base (DIB) in those countries that have the 
capability. Despite defence offsets’ developmental prospects, there are several 
opposing views on its use.5 
South Africa has two sets of industrial participation policies and practices. 
One is the DIP, managed exclusively by Armscor, South Africa’s acquisition 
agency. DIP favours pursuing defence industry development objectives. The other 
is the National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP), managed independently 
by the Department of Trade and Industry (dti) that focuses primarily on civil 
industry. Both programmes (DIP and NIPP) are often erroneously conflated and 
collectively referred to as ‘offsets’, which may create the impression that they are 
synonymous. The objectives of both programmes in terms of the percentage 
obligation, discharge and penalty requirements compare well with international 
best practice.6 
According to the 2012 study by Avascent, estimates show that from 2005 
to 2011, approximately USD 214 billion in total offsets obligations were generated 
worldwide.7 Although general indications are that defence spending has been in a 
constant decline since 2006,8 there are indications pointing towards an upward 
swing as from 2018.9 This growth in defence spending will inevitably cause 
increased countertrade and offset activities. 
Defence spending in South Africa had declined from a high of 15 percent 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the mid-1980s to around 1,7 percent by 
2013. This includes the SDP’s loan repayment.10 However, the 2014 Defence 
Review states that this level of defence spending is too low to re-stock the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF), and a call was made to increase this to 
around 2,4 percent of the GDP.11 This would inevitably cause an increase in DIP 
and NIPP transactions and, therefore, it is predicted that South Africa will remain 
in the top twenty offset markets.12  
Defence industrial participation in the context of countertrade 
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Since its inception in 1988, the Armscor countertrade programme has used 
the reciprocity principles of leveraged government procurement.13 Reciprocity 
principles solicit countertrade benefits in a structured manner.14 Between 1988 and 
1999, Armscor entered into various countertrade transactions that manifested as 
counter-purchased goods for export to the value of R5,1 billion.15    
Until late 1996, Armscor was the only government entity in South Africa 
that required countertrade on foreign procurement contracts. However, on 30 April 
1997, Cabinet ratified Parliament’s 1996 decision to allow the dti to impose the 
NIPP at national level.16 This necessitated redrafting the Armscor countertrade 
policy that had been in use since the late 1980s into a new defence industrial 
participation policy directly aimed at retaining, maintaining, and further developing 
the local DIB. 
In the South African countertrade programme, the DIP is highly 
prescriptive about types of activities and what qualifies for DIP (offset) credit.17  In 
this instance, ‘prescriptive’ refers particularly to Armscor’s expectation that the 
potential supplier should propose a combination of DIP activities in the form of 
work share on the purchased equipment (co-production), technology transfer 
(including training), investments (capital infrastructure improvement, equipment, 
tooling, test benches, etc.) and the export of defence-related products.18 The DIP 
overshadowed the less structured NIPP programme that was far less successful 
with many an aborted civil venture.19  
The 1999 strategic defence package in perspective 
The development of the South African DIB commenced in earnest as from 
the mid-1960s.20 For example, Henk notes that by then, there were already 
approximately 1 000 defence-related companies, by the mid-1980s this figure was 
over 2 000, and by the end of the 1980s, it was approximately 3 000.21 Botha 
records that by the mid-1980s, Armscor had concluded contracts with 
approximately 2 700 private sector companies and the armaments industry 
employed 131 750 people.22 This figure represented 8,3 percent of the total number 
of employees in the manufacturing sector at that stage. By the mid-1980s, the 
industry had acquired the ability to design, reverse-engineer, manufacture, produce, 
maintain, refurbish, upgrade and modify a wide range of defence equipment.23 
The defence industry’s rather rapid development and need to acquire 
superior military technologies can be linked to the war in Angola where the South 
African forces were confronted with sophisticated Russian-made military 
equipment.24 On the other hand, the various UN embargoes against South Africa 
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arguably accelerated this growth. However, from the late 1980s, as a result of FW 
de Klerk’s reform initiatives that led to the release of Nelson Mandela and the 
disbanding of all South Africa’s political resistance movements, there were no 
major defence procurement activities25 and according to Engelbrecht, the local 
defence industry shrank from “shark to minnow”.26 This decline continued after the 
African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994 but was stopped with the 
award of the 1999 SDP contracts and thus provided the DIB with a desperately 
needed lifeline.27  
The Department of Defence’s (DoD’s) 1996 Defence White Paper and the 
1997 Defence Review contain specific government mandates to re-equip the 
SANDF. The arms of service most in need were the South African navy and the air 
force. The government emphasised South Africa’s ability to be able to defend itself 
against various threats to national security.28 The DoD’s 1999 White Paper on the 
defence-related industry acknowledges the decline in the local defence industrial 
base.29 
The SDP process commenced in 1997 resulting in a series of tender 
invitations and evaluations during 1998, followed by strenuous negotiations during 
1999.30 The cabinet approved the final recommendation on 1 December 1999 to 
award the SDP contracts with a combined base value of R30 289 billion,31 and a 
base DIP commitment of R15 326 billion. 
The SDP contracts included patrol corvettes and submarines from 
Germany, helicopters from the Unite Kingdom and Italy, Hawk aircrafts from the 
United Kingdom, and Gripen aircrafts from Sweden. The DIP stemming from these 
contracts was to be discharged between 2000 and 2007/8. However, the direct DIP 
activities of the Hawk and Gripen aircrafts were linked to their respectively 
delivery schedules, to be finalised by 2009 and 2011 respectively, with all the 
technologies and indirect activities by 2007. Due to the delay in contracting the 
corvettes’ surface-to-surface missiles from MBDA, France, there is an amount of 
R949 million that will only be discharged by 2016.32 
The 2014 Defence Review reaffirms that the SANDF must be appropriately 
equipped, resourced and trained to execute successful multi-role operations across 
all areas of potential conflict.33 The Review confirms that the defence force 
remains in a critical state of decline characterised by an imbalance between its 
force capabilities, and the unaffordability of many of its main operating systems.34 
The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital is 
both “severely disjointed and institutionally crippling” and mismatches the actual 
requirement for equipment.35 
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However, arresting the decline in South Africa’s DIB will not happen 
immediately; it will take at least five years, and another five years before a ‘limited 
sustainable capability’ can be reached.36  
Manifestation of the 1997 defence industrial participation objectives  
The 1997 DIP policy primarily focused on a retention-type strategy rather 
than an expansion-type one largely because of the serious decline in the DIB since 
the late 1980s. Being able to create additional capabilities and jobs (stated policy 
objectives) would have been a bonus. The DIP policy was aligned with the 
respective Defence White Paper of 1996, the Defence Review of 1997, and the 
White Paper on the Defence-related Industry of 1999.37 
The DIP evaluation guidelines of the SDP issued in 1998 to potential 
suppliers stated the various strategically important aspects required by the SANDF. 
However, DIP was non-prescriptive about the activities within which suppliers had 
to engage with the South African Defence Industry (SADI). The only exception 
was the corvette combat suite that was not a DIP prescription, but a formal tender 
requirement.38 With hindsight, many more strategic requirements should have been 
included in the respective SDP tenders.39  
The 2014 Aerospace Maritime and Defence (AMD) review on the effect of 
DIP acknowledges that an extended DIP negotiation process could have resulted in 
more effective structuring. Instead, there was no manufacturing framework and no 
related national technology to guide obligors to align industrial activities with 
national priorities. The ‘compartmentalisation’ of DIP and NIP (National Industrial 
Participation Programme) did not contribute to the envisaged approach to industrial 
participation.40 
Notwithstanding some of the criticism recorded, there is clear evidence that 
the DIP objectives were indeed served, arguably not optimally. Nevertheless, this 
article postulates a contrary view to those of particularly Brauer and Dunne41 
supported by, for example, Holden and Van Vuuren,42 as well as Crawford-
Browne,43 who postulate that offset seldom yields any long-term benefits. From a 
purely economic impact assessment (EIA) point of view, the DIP achieved the 
following policy objectives: 
 For example 7 970 direct jobs,44 with 20 043 indirect jobs and 30 989 
induced jobs were retained − a total of 59 002.45 It is therefore argued 
that the DIP objective of retaining jobs was thus met and further losses 
stopped.46 
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 Promoting exports was another DIP policy objective. In this regard, DIP 
credits for R9,9 billion were granted by 2012. During the proceedings of 
the Arms Procurement Commission (APC47) of Inquiry during 2013 to 
2014, there were several testimonies of DIP contributions to the DIB 
with concomitant sustainability.48  
 Another DIP policy objective was for ‘like-for-like technology transfer’. 
In this instance, Armscor awarded DIP credits to the value of R4 
billion49, 28 percent of the total DIP commitment. Gerber 50 attributes the 
growth of SADI exports to these technology transfers.51 Although SADI 
companies were entrenched into global supply chains, there are concerns 
that the relationships with European defence companies could have been 
asymmetrical in the sense that some of the exported goods were clearly at 
a lower technological level than the goods imported.52 
At the SDP equipment-specific level, the following is recorded in respect 
of key DIP activities that were caused by DIP obligations stemming from 
the various programmes. The various media reports and periodical 
publications covering the basis of these observations are, to say the least, 
quite vast, which makes detailed referencing impractical.53 The following 
are examples of those activities that are related to the DIP objective of 
sustainability: 
 In the corvette programme, for example, the combat suite retained a 
wide array of local technologically advanced capabilities also at 
various sub-contractor levels – command and control electronics, 
sensoric and armament. This included Denel’s surface to air missile 
system (Umkhonto), which led the Finish navy54 to select the same 
missile system. Locally produced parts of the corvette platform are 
still ordered for export.55 Under this programme, the DIP delivered 
R1,6 billion in sales and exports, R520 million in technology 
transfers and R26 million in investments. 
 The DIP submarine contract resulted in a technology transfer that 
enabled Laingsdale Engineering to manufacture Junghans 
(Germany) self-destruct fuses for 40mm grenades.56 Submarine 
radar warning receivers were delivered to Greece, Portugal and 
South Korea, and electronic support measures (ESM) systems for 
German navy mine-hunters.57 Under this programme, the DIP 
delivered R867 million in sales and exports, R364 million in 
technology transfers and R8 million in investments. 
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 Denel Aviation (later Aerostructures) manufactured 25 Agusta 
A109 light utility helicopters (LUH) – this allowed them to 
undertake structural modifications later.58 Turbomeca Africa (TMA) 
produced the gearbox of the LUH and continues to provide 
maintenance support to several South African Air Force (SAAF) 
aircraft engines and sub-systems. Various sensoric equipment, and 
sand filters were supplied locally. Rotor blades manufactured for the 
SAAF A109 helicopters were subsequently also exported to Agusta, 
Italy.59 Under this programme, the DIP delivered R676 million in 
sales and exports, R487 million in technology transfers and R31 
million in investments. 
 On the Hawk programme, Denel was contracted for the component 
manufacture and the final assembly of the aircraft. Denel’s 
munitions group (PMP) received a number of major contracts from 
BAE Systems. PMP also acquired the licence from BAE Systems to 
produce the ammunition (30mm) for the Hawk’s cannon, which is 
being exported worldwide. PMP also acquired rights for the ejection 
seat cartridges (‘shelf-life-expire’ items) for both Hawk and Gripen. 
The Hawk’s ‘mission design authority’ technology was transferred 
to Denel, allowing several kinds of weapon systems integration.60 
Denel remains in a position to carry out maintenance and any 
modification work that may be required by the SAAF. Various 
follow-on DIP contracts have been received by Aerosud from 
Airbus and Boeing. Saab Grintek secured export contracts for health 
and usage monitoring systems (HUMS) for the Hawks operated by 
the Royal Air Force, the NATO Flying Training Centre in Canada, 
the Royal Australian air force and the Indian air force. HUMS will 
be a standard feature in all future Hawk orders.61 Under this 
programme, the DIP delivered R3,3 billion in sales and exports, 
R973 million in technology transfers and R17 million in 
investments. 
 The contribution of the Gripen to the sustainability of the SADI is 
quite varied. One of the high credit value activities was the Skills 
Transfer and Technology Programme (STTP) with Denel.62 Under 
the STTP, some 100 aircraft manufacturing staff and engineers were 
trained in Sweden.63 Because of this particular capability, Denel 
Aerostructures was awarded a part production share in the Airbus 
A400M military cargo aircraft.64 Denel Aerostructures is the only 
  153 
 
Tier 1 supplier outside Europe of manufactured parts to the A400M. 
In June 2014, Airbus Military placed a third multimillion-rand 
contract with Denel. According to Schür,65 Denel dramatically 
changed the way it used to approach manufacturing, as a direct 
result of being exposed to different technologies and training under 
the various DIP programmes.  
 Since 2003, Denel Optronics (later Carl Zeiss Optronics – now 
Cassidian) secured contracts for its helmet-mounted tracking system 
(HTS) for the Gripen, which led to an export contract in May 2007 
for the Eurofighter-Typhoon aircraft valued at R200 million. Seven 
hundred HTS units were reported to be manufactured over a four- to 
five-year period, that is 2007 to 2012.66 Optronics also 
manufactured the attack periscopes for the navy’s submarines, as 
well as providing maintenance support. The Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR) obtained much-needed technical 
information on the Saab/Ericsson, Swedish-produced PS-05A long-
range radar. Tactical simulation development of digital models and 
data links for radar warning receivers were also linked to the CSIR’s 
virtual ground-based air defence system demonstrator (in 
collaboration with Denel Dynamics). This DIP activity positioned 
the CSIR to help develop a local capability to understand the 
Gripen’s complex 4th-generation digital flight control system, 
needed for the successful integration of the Denel-manufactured 5th-
generation air-to-air missile system (A-Darter).67  
 In 2005, Saab acquired a 70,3 percent equity in Grintek and 
subsequently boosted the former Grintek’s turnover with USD 16 
million. Saab Grintek is Sweden’s biggest operation outside 
Sweden. It employs 1 064 people, many highly technically skilled. 
The company boasts with a turnover of R1,4 billion, 60 percent of 
which came from exports in 2011. It has become a manufacturing 
base for the Swedish group in Africa, supplying and serving 
countries in East, West and Southern Africa. The company employs 
highly skilled technical staff and approximately 10 percent of its 
turnover is re-invested in Research and Development (R&D).68 Saab 
Grintek participated extensively in system design and optimisation 
of the Gripen radar and electronic warfare systems to meet the 
contracted SAAF specifications. These upgrades are now an integral 
part of the Swedish, Hungarian, Czech and Thai air forces.69 Saab 
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Grintek will supply all microwave components and sub-systems for 
all future Gripens.70 Under this programme, the DIP delivered R3,2 
billion in sales and exports, R1,75 billion in technology transfers 
and R173 million in investments. 
 The maritime helicopter’s DIP resulted in R519 million in sales and 
exports, R31 million in technology transfers and R3 million in 
investments. The DIP-related activities stemming from these figures 
were mainly in the electronic sectors of (Saab) Grintek and 
(Cassidian) Denel Optronics. Aerosud was contracted to supply 
engineering services for the infrared suppression system and 
armoured crew seat for the Lynx helicopter, while Saab Grintek was 
contracted to supply electronic warfare equipment. Aerosud and 
Saab Grintek appear to be the preferred suppliers of this equipment 
− also for the export market. 
Therefore, the DIP was successful and sustainable in many instances on 
many levels through sales and exports, technology transfer, investments, and job 
creation as noted through the above-mentioned observations. 
The developmental importance of defence industrial participation 
An EIA was done on the DIP to determine its productive industrial 
importance. The National Social Accounting Matrix (NSAM) applying the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 38 was used for this. The NSAM is a 
database consisting of computable tables that reflect a given economy’s structure.71 
Since it is compiled for a specific period, it describes the economy for that 
particular period.72 Due to the extensive backward and forward links inherent in the 
social accounting matrix, the resulting ‘ripples’ from the initial intervention would 
flow into other sectors. Eventually, these ‘ripples’ could be totalled to determine 
the effect on economic production, GDP, employment and household income. For 
example, the total expenditure on the range of SDP equipment over the period 
2000 to 2012 was used to calculate the economic influence on the wider economy. 
The results of the DIP’s macroeconomic effect (at 2013 prices, based on the DIP 
info published by Armscor in their 2012/13 Annual Report) are summarised below 
in Table 1. 
Production is the process through which labour and assets are used to 
transform inputs of goods and services into outputs of other goods and services. 
The impact assessment measured the expected changes in production as a result of 
the respective DIP projects. Between 2000 and 2012, the total value of the DIP of 
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R14,17 billion was mainly invested in manufacturing and the transfer of 
technology. This implies a further benefit to the economy in the form of household 
income and its effects on spending, creating a demand for consumer goods and 
services, investment and potential growth. Secondly, gross national product (GNP) 
is the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a 
given period. The assessment therefore measured the effect of the various DIP 
projects on the South African economy, and concluded that the DIP raised the level 
of economic activity by R3.03 for every DIP rand.  
 
Variable 
Effect of the DIP on the South African economy – 2013 prices 
Direct 
effect Indirect effect 
Induced 
effect Total effect 
Production  
(R million) 












2 591.86 2 120.70 3 320.22 8 032.79 
Table 1: The economic impact assessment of the SDP’s DIP73 
Based on the DIP’s EIA, the total value of income earned by those 
employed as a result of the DIP is estimated at about R8,03 billion. Individuals and 
households used this income to fund daily consumer goods and services, such as 
education, transport and housing. All of these are important elements of 
developmental discourse. 
Conclusion 
The DIP policy of 1 April 1997 (A-POL-6100) endeavoured to underwrite 
the developmental aims and objectives of Armscor in relation to the SADI as 
contained in the 1996 Defence Review, the White Papers of 1997 and 1999, and in 
legislation (i.e. Armaments Development and Production Act 57 of 1968, as 
amended – replaced by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act, 
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Act 51 of 2003). Although, by law, Armscor remains largely in charge of the DIB 
process, the 2014 Defence Review makes it clear that there needs to be much better 
alignment of the DIB development strategies with national industrial development 
imperatives. Planning around the utilisation and optimisation of the DIP in relation 
to the further development of the DIB can clearly no longer occur in insolation. 
This has to include the creation of a much closer collaboration between the DIP 
(Armscor) and NIP (the DTI) custodians. 
DIP directly caused a substantial number of mergers between prominent 
European defence companies74 and SADI companies. As a result, SADI companies 
have been entrenched in the international global supply chains of various original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), which contributed to sustainability and a 
stabilised DIB. However, there are some concerns that the technology base of the 
DIB has the potential to be compromised.75  
Despite the various positive achievements of the 1997 DIP policy 
objectives, it remains criticised for not having optimised the industrial prospects 
for the broader industrial base. If a properly contracted DIP baseline is required 
before tender award (as alluded to by the 2014 Defence Review), clearly bidders 
will require additional time to conclude binding DIP contracts with SADI before 
signing contracts with Armscor. The DoD and Armscor will have to be much 
bolder in their DIP requirement statements at tendering if they wish to build on 
technologically advanced capabilities in certain sectors of the DIB. This will 
require a better, more detailed procurement and acquisition plan that must be 
incorporated into the DoD’s strategic capital acquisition master plan (SCAMP). 
Although SADI is the 17th largest exporter of defence equipment,76 the 
2014 Review77 emphasises the need for much more efficient links with related 
government initiatives. This is necessary to ascertain how DIP (and its NIPP 
counterpart) as a reciprocal trade mechanism can be better used to promote the 
developmental aims and objectives of the government, and in particular the DIB. 
Therefore, it is clear that further research, reviews and revisions are required in 
respect of South Africa’s industrial participation dispensation. 
Finally, the manner in which DIP was structured in 1997, contractually 
applied in 1999 and subsequently executed between 2000 and 2012, indicates that 
it was primarily focused on retention rather than growth.78 Based on the respective 
manifestations of DIP activities across SADI and the EIA results, it is postulated 
that the DIP (and thus countertrade in its broader sense), despite its developmental 
adversity, can indeed be used as a development tool for industry (through work 
share and technology transfer), the economy (through contributing to the 
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productive industrial sector) and human capital (through contributing skills 
development and training).79 The 2014 Armscor DIP policy review contains 
basically the same goals and objectives that were adopted in 1997. 
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